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ARGUMENTATION ABOUT 
MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT 
Marina Budić 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Enhancement. – 3. Moral Bioenhancement. – 4. The rela-
tion between cognition and motivation. – 5. Bioconservatives and Bioliberals. – 6. Ar-
guments. – 7. Critics and Objections. – 7.1. Unfair position. – 7.2. Identity Change. – 
7.3. Unnaturalness. – 7.4. Restricted Freedom. – 8. Conclusion.  
1. Introduction 
Each of us has a moral obligation to refrain from malice. Malice is mani-
fested in forms such as abuse, manipulation, blackmail, robbery, murder, and 
others. Scientific advances offer a possible solution for some of these crimes: 
moral enhancement of human beings through biomedical and biotechnologi-
cal means. Assuming the efficiency and security of moral enhancement, are we 
obliged to use biomedical and biotechnological interventions to reduce the 
likelihood of engaging in abuse? What is the goal of moral enhancement, and 
what is enhancing and to what extent? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions through a consideration of 
the arguments in favor of and against moral bioenhancement interventions. 
The first part of the paper exhibits and explicates the notion and meaning of 
enhancement, and subsequently thoroughly analyzes one form of enhance-
ment, namely moral bioenhancement. In the second part, the paper deals with 
arguments in favor of and against moral bioenhancement. The closing part of 
the paper is dedicated to the criticism concerning the restriction of freedom of 
a person who uses moral bioenhancers. The concluding remarks address the 
question whether objections on moral bioenhancement are conclusive and 
convincing or not. The issue of moral enhancement is important since moral 
behavior is, along with rationality, a precious and essential value that consti-
tutes us as human beings. 
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2. Enhancement 
Let us start by answering the question ‘what is enhancement?’. Enhance-
ment is a process that fixes or corrects our functioning. Biomedical technolo-
gies are routinely employed in an attempt to maintain or restore health. But 
many of these technologies can also be used to alter the characteristics of 
healthy individuals. Such interventions are termed biomedical enhancements 
by Douglas 1. Bioenhancement implies biomedical interventions that are used to 
improve human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to restore or sus-
tain health. Standard examples include: 
– cosmetic surgery and the use of biosynthetic growth hormone to increase 
stature) 2; 
– “blood doping” and steroid use to improve athletic endurance and 
strength 3; 
– psychopharmaceutical interventions to improve memory, cognitive ca-
pacities, and mood, and 4; 
– (almost entirely hypothetical) genetic and neurological manipulations to in-
crease the human life span, acquire new sensory-motor abilities, and, through 
“moral enhancement”, live together in more peaceable, generous, and just ways 5. 
 
 
1 T. DOUGLAS, Moral Enhancement, in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25, 3, 2008, p. 228. 
2 F.G. MILLER, H. BRODY, and K.C. CHUNG, Cosmetic Surgery and the Internal Morality of 
Medicine, in Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 9, 3, 2000, pp. 353-364; M. LITTLE, Cos-
metic Surgery, Suspect Norms, and the Ethics of Complicity, in E. PARENS (ed.), Enhancing Human 
Traits, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1998, pp. 162-176; G. WHITE, Human Growth 
Hormone: The Dilemma of Expanded Use in Children, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 3, 4, 
1993, pp. 401-409; P. CONRAD and D. POTTER, Human Growth Hormone and the Temptations of 
Biomedical Enhancement, in Sociology of Health and Illness, 26, 2, 2004, pp. 184-215. 
3 A. MIAH, Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport, New 
York: Routledge, 2004; T. MURRAY, Ethics, Genetics and the Future of Sport: Implications of 
Genetic Modification and Genetic Selection, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009; J. 
TOLLENEER, S. STERCKX, and P. BONTE, Athletic Enhancement, Human Nature and Ethics: 
Threats and Opportunities of Doping Technologies, New York: Springer, 2013. 
4 A. ELLIOTT, The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic Psychopharmacology, in E. 
PARENS (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications, Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 1998, pp. 177-188; P.J. WHITEHOUSE, E. JUENGST, M. MEHLMAN, and T.H. 
MURRAY, Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact, in The Hastings Center Report, 27, 3, 
1997, pp. 14-22; A. SANDBERG, Cognition Enhancement: Upgrading the Brain, in J. SAVULESCU, 
R. TER MEULEN, and G. KAHANE, (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities, New York: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011, pp. 71-91.  
5 E. JUENGST, D. MOSELEY, Human Enhancement, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
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It should be borne in mind that enhancement interventions affect specific 
human characteristics and traits rather than the person as a whole, which 
means that moral enhancers, for example, will not make a person who uses 
them completely moral, but will improve only certain characteristics that have 
an impact on her behavior in an ethical sense. Enhancement interventions at-
tempt to improve specific human capacities and traits, rather than whole per-
sons. For example, when it comes to moral enhancement, most people take it 
for granted, or rather too literally, and immediately object that some pill can 
not make us a moral person. This is true, but moral bioenhancement does not 
even imply this. It implies the use of a bioenhancer in order to influence a 
characteristic that contributes to moral behavior, specifically, for example, the 
development of empathy. 
Sometimes it may be difficult to understand that there is, or whether there 
is, a moral difference between enhancing the reduced functions to a normal 
level and increasing normal functions to super-normal levels. However, the 
notion of what is normal has changed over time, along with changes in ecolog-
ical and genetic factors. In addition, modern medicine and the development 
of science have led to changes in the understanding of the notion of the nor-
mal. A long time ago it used to be normal for women to die in childbirth, or 
for people to die from certain diseases. But today scientists have found the 
cure for many diseases, which are successfully treated by using drugs. The di-
viding line between treatments and enhancements has also become thinner. 
However, it remains controversial whether it is morally permissible to use bi-
omedical technologies to enhance people. 
Some argue that it would be better if people were more intelligent and 
physically stronger, and that there is no objection to using biomedical tech-
nologies to achieve these goals. But others hold that biomedical enhancement 
ought to be avoided altogether 6. 
3. Moral Bioenhancement 
Sometimes people behave in bad ways because they ignore what is good. 
More often, their bad behavior stems from the lack of will to act otherwise, 
or from having bad motives. The development of science enables us to 
 
 
phy (Spring 2016 Edition), edited by E.N. ZALTA, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/ 
entries/enhancement/; J. SAVULESCU, R. MEULEN, and G. KAHANE (eds.), Enhancing Human 
Capacities, New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.  
6 T. DOUGLAS, Moral Enhancement, cit., p. 228. 
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change our motives in order to act more morally. What could motivate peo-
ple to use such inventions is the increase in the number of crimes, immoral 
behavior, damage, and destruction. We are not talking about the risks and 
dangers caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, but rather about risks 
and dangers caused by human beings. This is mostly the result of scientific 
progress that allows, for instance, a person to use nuclear weapons. Mass de-
struction, unlike theft or the killing of one man, poses a danger to the entire 
human race. 
Moral enhancement can be defined as an increase in the moral value of the 
actions or character of a moral agent. It implies the improvement of moral 
dispositions. Moral bioenhancers affect self-control, empathy, benevolence, 
and other desirable characteristics that discourage tendencies towards vio-
lence, aggression, and racism. Thomas Douglas sets out his definition of moral 
enhancement in the following way: «A person morally enhances herself if she 
alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having 
morally better future motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have 
had. He understands motives to be the psychological – mental or neural – 
states or processes that will, given the absence of opposing motives, cause a 
person to act» 7. 
Unlike the most frequently mentioned varieties of enhancement, enhance-
ments satisfying this formula for moral enhancement could not easily be criti-
cized on the ground that their use by some would disadvantage others. Re-
garding intelligence enhancement, for example, it could be argued that if one 
person makes herself more intelligent she may disadvantage the unenhanced 
by out-competing them for jobs, or by discriminating against them on the ba-
sis of their lower intelligence. These arguments may be persuasive when di-
rected against the most commonly discussed biomedical enhancements – 
physical ability enhancements, intelligence and memory enhancements, and 
natural lifespan enhancements. But they appear much less persuasive as objec-
tions to moral bioenhancement. On any plausible moral theory, a person’s 
having morally better motives will tend to be to the advantage of others. In-
deed, on some views, the fact that having some motive would tend to ad-
vantage others is what makes it a morally good motive 8. 
It is not immediately clear what sorts of psychological changes would 
count as moral enhancements. There are at least two reasons for this lack of 
clarity. First, there is little agreement on which motives are morally good, and 
 
 
7 Ibid., p. 229. 
8 Ibid., p. 230. 
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to what degree. Whereas some would claim that it is best to be motivated by 
normative beliefs formed as a result of correct reasoning processes, others 
would emphasize the importance of moral emotions, such as sympathy. Oth-
ers still would favor some mixture of the two. Moreover, this disagreement 
cannot be resolved by appealing to some view about what sorts of considera-
tions determine the moral goodness of a motive, since here there is even less 
agreement. For example, some would hold that a motive is morally good to 
the extent that it tends to produce good consequences, while others would 
hold that motives are good to the extent that they are partly constitutive of 
certain virtues 9. Second, both what counts as a good motive and what counts 
as an improvement in one’s motives will be different for different people, or 
people performing different roles. For a judge, a certain sort of legal reasoning 
might be the best motive, whereas for a parent love might be more appropri-
ate. Similarly, for a person who feels little sympathy for others, an increase in 
sympathy might count as a moral improvement. But for someone who is al-
ready overwhelmed by feelings of sympathy, any such increase is unlikely to 
count as an improvement 10. 
Despite these difficulties, Douglas thinks it would be possible to identify 
several kinds of psychological changes that would uncontroversially qualify as 
moral enhancements for some people under some circumstances. The author 
believes there are some emotions – henceforth, the counter-moral emotions – 
whose attenuation would sometimes count as a moral enhancement, regard-
less of which plausible moral and psychological theories one accepted. One 
example of a counter-moral emotion might be a strong aversion to certain ra-
cial groups. Such an aversion would be an uncontroversial example of a bad 
motive. It might also interfere with what would otherwise be good motives. It 
might, for example, lead to a kind of subconscious bias in a person who is at-
tempting to weigh up the claims of competing individuals as part of some rea-
soning process. Alternatively, it might limit the extent to which a person is 
able to feel sympathy for a member of the racial group in question 11.  
A second example would be the impulse towards violent aggression. This 
impulse may occasionally count as a good motive. If I am present when one 
person attacks another on the street, impulsive aggression may be exactly what 
is required of me. But, on many occasions, impulsive aggression seems to be a 
morally bad motive to have – for example, when one has just been mildly pro-
 
 
9 Ibid., p. 231. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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voked. Moreover, as with racial aversion, it could also interfere with good mo-
tives. It might, for example, cloud a person’s mind in such a way that reason-
ing becomes difficult and the moral emotions are unlikely to be experienced. 
Douglas concludes that there are some emotions such that a reduction in the 
degree to which an agent experiences those emotions would, under some cir-
cumstances, constitute a moral enhancement 12.  
The definitions of moral enhancement that we have discussed in this chap-
ter suggest that moral enhancement implies not only the enhancement of one's 
cognitive ability to understand morality, but also an increased tendency to act 
in accordance with one’s moral beliefs. Moral enhancement thus entails the 
narrowing of the gap between our understanding of morality (how we believe 
we should act) and our behavior (how we actually act). It follows that the moti-
vation to act morally (i.e. according to how we believe we should act) is the es-
sential disposition of morally improved people. Consequently, bridging the gap 
between understanding and motivation is essential for moral enhancement. 
To be morally enhanced is to have those dispositions which make it more 
likely that you will arrive at the correct judgement of what the right thing to 
do is, and more likely to act on that judgement 13. 
We can also raise the question whether moral enhancers should be provid-
ed only to criminals and “bad” people, or to the entire population, i.e., to all 
those who want to improve themselves morally. It is a very interesting and im-
portant question whether moral enhancement should be permitted, and if so, 
whether it should be compulsory or voluntary. A lively debate debate between 
Persson and Savulescu, Harris, Vojin Rakić, and several other authors has de-
veloped on this question. In this paper I focus on the issue of whether moral 
bioenhancement is permissible or whether it should be prohibited. 
Here is one example of moral enhancement by using moral bioenhancers. 
The example is given by Persson and Savulescu: 
«John is a professor of mathematics at the University of Oxford. Everyday, he 
passes a beggar sitting in the front of his college. The woman is in rags and asks for 50 
p for shelter that night. John always averts his gaze and walks as far as possible away 
from her. He never gives her any money. John is relatively wealthy and prefers to buy 
expensive bottles of claret from the College cellar for himself and his friends. John 
takes a drug which makes him more interested in the suffering of others, more empa-
 
 
12 Ibid., p. 231. 
13 J. SAVULESCU, I. PERSSON, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, in Monist, 
95, 3, 2012, p. 403. 
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thetic, more capable of vividly imagining what it would be like to be in another per-
son’s shoes. The drug is like a pair of “moral spectacles”, clarifying his vision of the 
other. He looks at the beggar, reflects more about her suffering and so decides to give 
the beggar an apple. He does not give money because he believes the beggar will use 
it imprudently. In this case, there is the right sort of connection deliberation and 
judgement. John acts for reasons, as much as anyone acts for reasons. He just got to 
see things the right way. John’s giving the apple was not unfree – it was virtuous. Im-
agine that John, when he took the drug, always behaved in the morally correct way. 
He would not be unfree. He would be the most virtuous person.» 14  
Now let us consider the characteristics necessary for moral behavior which 
can be influenced by certain medicines. Could we, through our knowledge of 
biology, strategically influence people’s moral dispositions and behavior? 
There are reasons to believe that we could. Historically, drugs and surgical 
procedures, such as lobotomy, were used in an attempt to control behavior. 
But today, sophisticated and ever more powerful cognitive science is provid-
ing new and more effective means of influencing human choices 15.  
Indeed, a number of drugs are already prescribed specifically for their 
choice-altering effects, which have effects relevant to moral behavior: the anti-
alcohol abuse drug disulfuram, the weight loss drug orlistat, and anti-libidinal 
agents used to reduce sexual re-offending. Neuropsychology is beginning to 
provide more robust evidence for the existence of biological correlates of 
morally relevant traits, e.g., aggression, trust and empathy. Ramachandran and 
colleagues have begun to identify the neural loci of empathic responses in 
humans and animals 16. This research may lead to developing pharmacological 
 
 
14 Ibid., pp. 407-408. 
15 Psychological research is affording strategies to influence choice: a range of unconscious 
stimuli can affect choice through priming (A. KIESEL, A. WAGENER, W. KUNDE, J. HOFFMANN, 
A.J. FALLGATTER, C. STOCKER, Unconscious Manipulation of Free Choice in Humans, in Con-
sciousness and Cognition, 15, 2006, pp. 397-408). One prominently discussed technique is the 
‘nudge’ strategy, which harnesses knowledge about ‘cognitive biases’ that may influence volun-
tary choice (R.H. THALER, C. SUNSTEIN, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) These ideas are affecting health policy (A. 
CHARKRABORTTY, From Obama to Cameron: Why Do So Many Politicians Want a Piece of Rich-
ard Thaler?, in The Guardian, 8 July 2008.) A number of commonly employed antidepressants 
and antihypertensives (see S. TERBECK, G. KAHANE, S. MCTAVISH, J. SAVULESCU, P. COWEN, 
M. HEWSTONE, Emotion in Moral Decision Making: Beta Adrenergic Blockade Increases Deonto-
logical Moral Judgments, forthcoming) affect moral behaviour as a side effect (according to J. 
SAVULESCU, I. PERSSON, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, cit., p. 401). 
16 S. RAMACHANDRAN VILAYANUR, M. OBERMAN, Lindsay Broken Mirrors: A Theory Of Au-
tism, in Scientific American, 295, 2006, pp. 62-9.  
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interventions to improve empathy, cooperation and trust 17. Indeed, empirical 
research has already shown that propranolol can reduce implicit racial bias 18.  
Although there are some aspects of our moral psychology that are exceed-
ingly complex, it is possible to extract some characteristics that have a biologi-
cal and genetic basis, that contribute to moral behavior, and which can be in-
fluenced by certain medicines. 
Willingness to co-operate with other people is one of them. Another trait is 
impulse control. If one cannot withstand temptation and delay gratification, 
one will be less likely to sacrifice her own interests for some moral goal. Drugs 
which increase impulse control can thus contribute to more moral behavior. 
Ritalin, Adderall and other drugs improve impulse control in children with 
attention deficit disorder, indeed reducing violence and antisocial behavior 19.  
A common, specific form of self-sacrifice is altruism, which is usually taken 
to be uncontroversial as a basis of morality. Altruism involves the sacrifice of 
one’s own interests for the welfare of others (as opposed to sacrificing one’s 
interests in order to achieve some non-welfarist moral goal). Alongside altru-
ism, a sense of justice is a central moral disposition. Both have been shown to 
have a biological basis. Björn Wallace and associates have found that, in the 
case of identical twins (who share the same genes), there is a striking correla-
tion in what they consider to be unfair and fair in Ultimatum games. There is 
no such correlation in the case of fraternal twins. This indicates that the hu-
man sense of fairness has a genetic basis 20. According to Simon Baron-Cohen, 
there is also a striking correlation in respect of altruism in identical twins. If 
there is a genetic basis to some trait, such as a sense of justice or altruism, this 
opens the door to future biological manipulation of that trait. Even if control-
ling that trait is impossible, changing the strength or nature of a disposition, 
even to a small degree, can have effect on moral behavior 21.  
 
 
17  C.K.W. DE DREU, L.L. GREER, M.J.J. HANDGRAAF, M.J.J. OXYTOCIN, S. SHALVI, 
G.A.VAN KLEEF, Promotes Human Ethnocentrism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, 108, 4, 2011, pp. 1262-6.  
18 J. SAVULESCU, I. PERSSON, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, cit., p. 400. 
19 S. TERBECK, G. KAHANE, S. MCTAVISH, J. SAVULESCU, P. COWEN, M. HEWSTONE, Beta-
Adrenergic Blockade Reduces Implicit Negative Racial Bias. Under review a Terbeck, S. TERBECK; 
G. KAHANE, S. MCTAVISH, J. SAVULESCU, P. COWEN, M. HEWSTONE, Emotion in Moral Deci-
sionmaking: Beta Adrenergic Blockade Increases Deontological Moral Judgments. Under review 
bp. 407.  
20 According to SAVULESCU and PERSSON, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Ma-
chine, cit., p. 405.  
21 Ibid. 
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Moral enhancers would enable us to improve our capacity for empathy, 
solidarity, gratitude, forgiveness, and other morally desirable traits. Examples 
of moral enhancement include a reduction in the dislike of certain racial 
groups, as well as a lessening of impulsive violent aggression. Douglas refers to 
a number of relevant findings: oxytocin has been shown to promote trust, 
SSRIs to increase cooperation and reduce aggression, while methylphenidate 
reduces violent belligerence; furthermore, the biological basis for some per-
sonality types that give rise to immoral conduct appears to have been elucidat-
ed – antisocial personality disorder may have biological underpinnings, 
whereas criminality has been related to the MAO mutation on the X chromo-
some, especially when coupled with social deprivation 22. 
One substance shown to have effects on moral behavior is the hormone 
and neurotransmitter oxytocin. It facilitates birth and breastfeeding in hu-
mans and other mammals, but it also appears to mediate maternal care, pair 
bonding, and other pro-social attitudes, like trust, sympathy and generosity 23. 
Kosfeld and collaborators investigated the relationship between oxytocin and 
trust in a simple game of cooperation 24. Their results have shown that partici-
pants taking oxytocin exhibited significantly more trusting behavior 25.  
However, the effect of oxytocin on trusting and other pro-social behavior 
towards others appears to be sensitive to those others’ group membership. 
Studies by Carsten De Dreu and associates suggest that the pro-social effects 
of oxytocin may be limited to in-group members 26. Further experiments by 
De Dreu’s group indicated that oxytocin can also reduce pro-social behavior 
towards out-group members where this helps one’s in-group. A higher level of 
oxytocin amplifies the intensity of trust and reciprocity within an already fa-
 
 
22 According to V. RAKIĆ, From Cognitive to Moral Enhancement: A Possible Reconciliation 
of Religious Outlooks and the Biotechnological Creation of a Better Human, in Journal for the 
Study of Religions and Ideologies, 11, 31, 2012, p. 118. 
23 T.R. INSEL, F.D. RUSSELL, How the Brain Processes Social Information: Searching for the 
Social Brain, in Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 2004, pp. 697-722.  
24 M. KOSFELD, M. HEINRICHS, P.J. ZAK, U. FISCHBACHER, E. FEHR, Oxytocin Increases 
Trust in Humans, in Nature, 435, 7042, 2005, pp. 673-6.  
25 J. SAVULESCU, I. PERSSON, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, cit., p. 
401. 
26 C.K.W. DE DREU, L.L. GREER, M.J.J. HANDGRAAF, S. SHALVI, G.A.VAN KLEEF, M. BAAS, 
V. TEN, S. FEMKE, E. VAN DIJK, S.W.W. FEITH, Neuropeptide Oxytocin Regulates Parochial Altru-
ism in Intergroup Conflicts among Humans. Science, 328, 2010, pp. 1408-11; C.K.W. DE DREU, 
L.L. GREER, M.J.J. HANDGRAAF, S. SHALVI, G.A.VAN KLEEF, Oxytocin Promotes Human Ethno-
centrism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 4, 2011, pp. 1262-6. 
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vored group, rather than extending their range to out-groups 27.  
Another neurotransmitter implicated in moral behavior is serotonin. Selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are commonly prescribed for de-
pression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. They help govern activi-
ties such as eating and sleeping, and sexual activity. SSRIs work by slowing 
down the reabsorption of serotonin, a neurotransmitter crucially involved in 
mood regulation, thereby making more of it available to stimulate receptors. 
But SSRIs also seem to make subjects more fairminded and willing to cooper-
ate. So, modifications of such systems in the brain by drugs like SSRIs appear 
to have moral consequences 28. 
4. The relation between cognition and motivation 
Morally enhanced individuals do not only simply have enhanced cognitive 
abilities, as the narrowing of the cognition-motivation gap is not merely a cog-
nitive capacity. It is a capacity that pertains to our will. Moral enhancement 
implies adding motivational criteria to cognitive criteria 29. We undoubtedly 
have a sense of morality, a sense of right and wrong. We usually know what is 
wrong, and what is right, but we do not always act in accordance with that. 
For example, we know that it is good to give to charity, but often we do not 
do that. Everybody may sometimes fall prey to an immoral act that they will 
not be proud of in the future. And that is precisely the point when we fre-
quently act differently than we think we ought to act. Hence, the following 
two issues are the most relevant where the comprehension motivation gap is 
concerned:  
1) Most people have a notion of right and wrong, which can be upgraded 
by cognitive enhancement. Such enhancement can be traditional enhancement 
or cognitive bioenhancement. 
2) Most people have a tendency not to act as they believe they ought to. 
They have some kind of motivational impairment (for whatever reason) 
against doing what they believe is right. That lack of motivation can be dealt 
with by moral enhancement. Such enhancement can be traditional enhance-
ment or moral bioenhancement. Moral enhancement, if understood as an in-
 
 
27 Ibid., p. 402. 
28 Ibid. 
29 V. RAKIĆ, We Must Create Beings with Moral standing Superior to Our Own, in Cambridge 
Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 24, 1, 2015, p. 60. 
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tervention that does not just make us understand morality better, but also re-
sults in us behaving more morally, is an intervention with such enormous 
implications that it amounts to nothing less than a moral status enhance-
ment 30. So, moral enhancement can be understood as an intervention that 
not only helps us understand morality better, but also leads us to act more 
morally.  
In his paper Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bi-
as, Vojin Rakić considers the question of whether cognitive enhancement is 
sufficient in itself, so that we do not need moral enhancement if we are cog-
nitively enhanced. He concludes that this is not the case. This is because 
knowing that something is right does not mean that we will automatically be 
motivated to act accordingly. Rakić gives convincing arguments and de-
scribes the problem in the following way: The discrepancy between what we 
do and what we believe is right to do might be the greatest predicament of 
our existence as moral beings. The essential issue is not only how to make us 
understand morality better, but how to morally enhance our actions. It is 
freedom, rather than cognition, that is at the heart of the matter. Hence, the 
key problem of morality comes down to how we use our freedom, to how we 
decide to act 31.  
Harris is certainly right in claiming that defects in cognition drive some of 
our immoral behavior. Garett Jones observes that smarter groups generally 
display more patience and perceptiveness, traits that are key to cooperative 
behavior. The implication is that intelligence is one of the drivers of moral be-
havior. When we are more intelligent, we cooperate more and are less prone 
to violent conflict or to secretive actions; hence, we might be less inclined to 
certain types of immoral behavior. Consequently, it is possible that enhanced 
intelligence might help us act more morally. We can improve our intelligence 
through better nourishment, healthier surroundings and better schooling in 
the world’s most impoverished countries. In other words, traditional means of 
cognitive enhancement might indeed be important for morality. But they do 
not appear to be sufficient, for two reasons:  
– morality has certain biological underpinnings, which cannot be affected 
by traditional means of cognitive enhancement and  
– traditional means of cognitive enhancement do not have the critical im-
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pact on us of bridging the gap between how we act, and how we think we 
should act 32  
Based on this, Rakić concludes that traditional types of cognitive enhance-
ment, or any other type of cognitive enhancement for that matter, do not ap-
pear to be the solution to our immoral behavior. Moral enhancement is unde-
niably needed as a supplement to cognitive enhancement 33. 
5. Bioconservatives and Bioliberals 
A sizeable body of literature has been devoted recently to arguments for 
and against the cognitive and/or moral enhancement of human beings. Harris, 
Savulescu, Persson, Douglas, Crockett, Wilson, DeGrazia, Agar, Sparrow, 
Rakić, Wasserman, Wiseman and others have written various articles and 
books on the topic.  
Bioconservatives have argued against bioenhancement, as they believe that 
it is aimed at intervening in what has been ordained by God or given to us by 
nature. Bioliberals, on the other hand, insist that nature is morally indifferent, 
from which it follows that we have a right to intervene in what nature has cre-
ated. In fact, they argue that we are doing that already when we fight certain 
natural phenomena that inflict harm on people: e.g., medications are adminis-
tered to patients who suffer from diseases (which are frequently naturally oc-
curring phenomena), dams are built to contain floodings, defenses against 
lightning are set up. Some bioliberals insist on our moral duty to enhance eve-
rything that can be enhanced. On the other hand, there are those who are 
against certain forms of enhancement but are by no means bioconservatives. 
For instance, they are against moral bioenhancement, at least in its currently 
possible form, but are not necessarily against cognitive bioenhancement (e.g., 
John Harris and Nicholas Agar).  
Persson and Savulescu assert that humanity is at risk of (self-) annihilation, 
or another form of what they call “ultimate harm,” if it does not embark on 
the path of moral bioenhancement. John Harris, on the other hand, maintains 
that this type of enhancement can be accomplished only to the detriment of 
our freedom. He insists on cognitive enhancement being sufficient for moral 
enhancement. Rakić argues against both Harris and the collaborative efforts 
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of Persson and Savulescu. Against Harris, he maintains that we might become 
cognitively enhanced, e.g., we might start to understand that racial prejudices 
are morally wrong, without acquiring the motivation to act upon this under-
standing. At the same time, Rakić argues against Persson and Savulescu’s posi-
tion that moral enhancement ought to be made compulsory 34. 
When it comes to those advocating moral bioenhancement, we will consid-
er their arguments in favor of these interventions. Why do they think that 
there is a need for these types of interventions? They suggest that it is evident 
that traditional means of moral enhancement, like education, are not efficient, 
because there are a lot of crimes and malice.  
Since human well-being is essential, it is not just the treatment and preven-
tion of disease that is relevant. Biological interventions to increase opportunity 
and happiness are morally justified as well. Even more than that, according to 
some authors, if it is our duty to treat and prevent disease, it is also our duty 
to intervene in what is given to us by nature, in order to provide an individual 
with the best prospects for having the best possible life 35. Furthermore, 
Persson and Savulescu argue that people now have at their disposal technolo-
gy so powerful that it could bring about the destruction of the whole planet if 
misused. Around the middle of the last century, a small number of states ac-
quired the power to destroy the world through the detonation of nuclear 
weapons. In this century, more people, perhaps millions, will acquire the 
power to destroy life on Earth through the use of biological weapons, nano-
technology, deployment of artificial intelligence, or cyberterrorism 36.  
Besides, these authors argue that it is comparatively easy to cause great 
harm, and much easier than to benefit to the same extent. Consider an every-
day illustration: most readers of this paper probably have access to a car and 
live in densely populated areas. Whenever you are driving, you could easily 
kill a number of people by ploughing into a crowd. But, we dare say, very few 
of you have the opportunity every day to save an equal number of lives. In-
deed, most of you have probably never had that opportunity, since this kind 
of situation happens only when, first, a large number of lives is threatened, 
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and, secondly, you are also in a position to eliminate that threat. Harris has 
tried to refute this argument by mentioning Mr Schuringa who averted a ter-
rorist attack. But such situations are exceedingly rare. Consequently, it seems 
indisputable that we are much more frequently in circumstances in which we 
could kill a number of people, than in situations in which we could save an 
equal number of people. In other words, it is easier for us to kill than to save 
lives 37. In addition, it is much easier to spread an infection, for example, than 
to prevent the infection and save people. The fact that it is easier to deliber-
ately spread an infection than prevent it is also shown by the fact that it re-
quires less medical knowledge. English colonial settlers spread smallpox 
among Aboriginal Australians and Native Americans by the simple means of 
distributing infected blankets. In contrast, effective protection against an in-
fectious disease requires the discovery of a vaccine, which takes sophisticated 
medical research 38. 
6. Arguments 
The argument of Persson and Savulescu in favor of moral bioenhancement 
is based on the following premises:  
1. It is comparatively easy to cause great harm, much easier than to benefit 
to the same extent.  
2. With the progress of science, which would be sped up by cognitive en-
hancement, it becomes increasingly possible for small groups of people, or 
even individuals, to cause great harm to millions of people, e.g. by means of 
deploying nuclear or biological weapons of mass destruction.  
3. Even if only a tiny fraction of humanity is immoral enough to want to 
cause large-scale harm by weapons of mass destruction in their possession, 
there are bound to be some such people in a huge human population as on 
Earth, unless humanity is extensively morally enhanced. (Or unless the human 
population is drastically reduced, or there is mass genetic screening and selec-
tion, though we take it that there is no morally acceptable way of achieving 
these sufficiently effectively.) 
4. A moral enhancement of the magnitude required to ensure that this will 
not happen is not scientifically possible at present and is not likely to be pos-
sible in the near future.  
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5. Therefore, the progress of science is in one respect for the worse by mak-
ing likelier the misuse of ever more effective weapons of mass destruction, and 
this badness is increased if scientific progress is sped up by cognitive enhance-
ment, until effective means of moral enhancement are found and applied 39. 
7. Critics and Objections 
The opponents of enhancement do not all set out to defend a common and 
clearly specified thesis. However, several of them would either assent or be 
attracted to the following claim (the Bioconservative Thesis): Even if it were 
technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical 
enhancement, it would not be morally permissible for them to do so 40. 
7.1. Unfair position 
The Bioconservative Thesis can be defended in various ways. One argu-
ment is based on social considerations: though enhancement may be good for 
the enhanced individuals, it might well be bad for others. Thus, regarding in-
telligence enhancement it could be argued that if one person makes herself 
more intelligent she might disadvantage the unenhanced by, for example, out-
competing them for jobs, or by discriminating against them on the basis of 
their lower intelligence. These arguments may be persuasive when directed 
against the most commonly discussed biomedical enhancements – physical 
ability enhancements, intelligence and memory enhancements, and natural 
lifespan enhancements. But there are other types of biomedical enhancement 
against which they appear much less persuasive. Moral enhancement is one. 41 
It is not clear how a morally enhanced person is supposed to harm other peo-
ple. Her moral enhancement could not disadvantage others. On any plausible 
moral theory, a person’s having morally better motives will tend to be to the 
advange of others. Indeed, on some views, the fact that having some motive 
would tend to advantage other is what makes it a morally good motive 42. 
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7.2. Identity Change 
Some critics argue that moral bioenhancement causes unjustified changes 
in the identity of the people using these bioenhancers. One bad effect of mor-
al enhancement might be the loss of identity of the person using the bioen-
hancers. Worries about identity loss have been raised as general objections to 
enhancement, and Douglas believes there is no obvious reason why they 
should not apply to cases of moral enhancement. Clearly, moral enhancement 
of the sort we are considering need not be identity altering in the strong sense 
that an individual will, post-enhancement, be a different person than they 
were before. Our moral psychologies change all the time, and sometimes they 
change dramatically, for example, following particularly traumatic experienc-
es. When these changes occur, we do not think that one person has literally 
been replaced by another. However, perhaps moral enhancement of a person 
would be identity-altering in the weaker sense that it would change some of 
their most fundamental psychological characteristics – characteristics that are, 
for example, central to how they view themselves and their relationships with 
others, or that pervade their personality. However, plausibly, we have reasons 
to preserve our fundamental psychological characteristics only where those 
characteristics have some positive value. But though someone’s counter-moral 
emotions may have some value (they may, for example, find the experience of 
them pleasurable), they need not have it 43. 
One might believe it is really important for her to preserve her fundamental 
psychological characteristics only when those characteristics have some positive 
value. Impulsiveness might be one of her fundamental characteristics, one which 
makes her recognizable to her group of friends, but it is certainly a negative 
characteristic that is not so good for her, or for her relationships with others. 
7.3. Unnaturalness 
The objection that moral bioenhancement is wrong because it is unnatural 
can be expressed through the following two statements: 
(1) using biomedical means to morally enhance oneself is unnatural, and:  
(2) this unnaturalness gives one a reason not to engage in such enhance-
ment 44.  
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In his paper 45, Thomas Douglas tried to challenge this objection, consider-
ing several different variants of the notion of unnaturalness.  
David Hume distinguished between three concepts of nature; one which 
may be opposed to ‘miracles’, one to ‘the rare and unusual’, and one to ‘arti-
fice’. This taxonomy suggests a similar approach to the concept of unnatural-
ness. We might equate unnaturalness with miraculousness (or supernatural-
ness), with rarity or unusualness, or with artificiality. Douglas considers whether 
any of these concepts of naturalness succeeds in rendering both (1) and (2) 
plausible 46. 
Unnaturalness as Supernaturalness 
Consider first the concept of unnaturalness as supernaturalness. On one 
popular account of this concept, something is unnatural if, or to the extent 
that, it lies outside the world that can be studied by the sciences. It seems 
clear, on this view, that biomedical interventions are not at all unnatural, for 
such interventions are precisely the sort of thing that could be studied by the 
sciences. The concept of unnaturalness as supernaturalness thus renders (1) 
clearly false 47. 
Unnaturalness as Unusualness 
The second concept of unnaturalness suggested by Hume’s analysis is that 
which can be equated with unusualness or unfamiliarity. Leon Kass’s idea of 
unnaturalness as disconnectedness from everyday human understanding may 
be a variant of this concept. Unusualness and unfamiliarity are relative con-
cepts in the following way: something has to be unusual or unfamiliar for or to 
someone. Thus, whether someone’s biomedical intervention would qualify as 
unnatural may depend on whom we relativise unusualness and unfamiliarity 
to. For us inhabitants of the present day, the use of biomedical technology for 
the purposes of moral enhancement certainly does qualify as unusual and un-
familiar, and thus, perhaps, as unnatural. But for some future persons, it 
might not. Absent any specification of how to relativise unusualness or unfa-
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miliarity, it is indeterminate whether (1) is true.  
We need not pursue these complications, however, since regardless of 
whether (1) comes out as true on the current concept of unnaturalness, (2) 
appears to come out false. It is doubtful whether we have any reason to avoid 
adopting means merely because they are unusual or unfamiliar, or disconnect-
ed from everyday human understanding. We may often prefer familiar means 
to unfamiliar ones, on the grounds that predictions about their effects will 
generally be better informed by evidence, and therefore more certain. Thus, if 
I am offered the choice between two different drugs for some medical condi-
tion, where both are thought to be equally safe and effective, I may choose the 
more familiar one on the grounds that it will probably have been better stud-
ied and thus have more certain effects. But the concern here is not ultimately 
with unnaturalness – or any other objectionable feature – of the means, but 
rather with the effects of adopting it 48.  
Unnaturalness as Artificiality  
Consider finally the concept of unnaturalness as artificiality. This is argua-
bly the most prevalent concept of naturalness in modern philosophy. It may 
be roughly characterised as follows: something is unnatural if it involves hu-
man action, or certain types of human action (such as intentional action). 
Claim (1) is quite plausible on this concept of unnaturalness. Biomedical in-
terventions clearly involve human action – and almost always intentional ac-
tion. However, (2) now looks implausible. Whenever we intentionally adopt 
some means to some end, that means involves intentional human action. But it 
does not follow from this that we have reason not to adopt that means. If it 
did, we would have reason not to intentionally adopt any means to any end. 
And this surely cannot be right. The implausibility of (2) on the current con-
cept of unnaturalness can also be brought out by returning to the case where 
moral enhancement is achieved through self-education, rather than biomedi-
cal intervention. Such enhancement seems unproblematic, yet it clearly in-
volves unnatural means if unnaturalness is analyzed as involving or being the 
product of (intentional) human action 49. 
We should consider, at this point, a more restrictive account of un-
naturalness as artificiality: one which holds that, in order to qualify as unnatural, 
something must not only involve (intentional) human action, it must also in-
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volve technology – the products of highly complex and sophisticated social prac-
tices such as science and industry. Moving to this account perhaps avoids the 
need to classify practices such as training and education as unnatural. But it still 
renders unnatural many practices which, intuitively, we may have no reasons to 
avoid on the basis of means. Consider, for example, the treatment of disease. 
This frequently involves biomedical technology, yet it is not clear that we have 
any reasons on the basis of means not to engage in it. To avoid this problem, the 
concept of unnaturalness as artificiality would have to be limited still further, 
such that technology-involving means count as unnatural only if they are not 
aimed at the treatment of disease. On this view, the means of someone who uses 
moral bioenhancers are not unnatural in themselves. Rather, the unnaturalness 
arises from the combination of their means with certain intentions or aims. Per-
haps by restricting the concept of unnaturalness in this way, we avoid classifying 
as unnatural practices (such as self-education, or the medical treatment of dis-
eases) that seem clearly unobjectionable. However, it remains unclear why, on 
this account of the unnatural, we should have reasons to avoid unnatural prac-
tices. In attempting to show that a person has reason not to engage in biomedi-
cal moral enhancement, it is not enough to simply stipulate some concept of 
unnaturalness according to which their engaging in moral enhancement comes 
out as unnatural, while seemingly less problematic practices come out as natural. 
It must be shown that a practice’s being unnatural makes it problematic, or at 
least provides evidence for its being problematic. Without such a demonstra-
tion, the allegation of unnaturalness does no philosophical work, but merely 
serves as a way of asserting that we have reasons to refrain from biomedical 
moral enhancement 50. 
So, we have seen that Douglas argues that none of the three concepts of 
unnaturalness that follow from the Hume analysis make plausible both of the 
claims (1) and (2). We can conclude that none of these concepts of unnatural-
ness provide us with any reason to refrain from moral enhancement.  
In addition, we could say that nature is morally indifferent. Nature might 
be good, or it might be bad. What is natural is not necessarily good or bad. If 
we did just what is natural, then we would not practice medicine, or treat ill-
nesses. We would also not practice science or develop new technology. So, 
there is nothing moral or immoral in what is natural or unnatural. We should 
think about what is good for us, and what is bad, not what is natural and what 
is not. 
 
 
50 Ibid., p. 238. 
178 Marina Budić 
7.4. Restricted Freedom 
This objection claims that moral bioenhancement limits the freedom of the 
people who use these interventions. By morally enhancing herself, a person 
will bring about that she has better post-enhancement motives, taken in sum, 
than she would otherwise have had. However, this result will come at a cost to 
her freedom: she will, after moral enhancement, lack the freedom to have and 
to act upon certain bad motives. And even though having and acting upon 
bad motives may itself have little value, it might be thought that the freedom 
to hold and act upon them is valuable. Indeed, this freedom might seem to be 
a central element of human rational agency. Arguably, a person has reasons 
not to place restrictions on this freedom. The objection can be captured in the 
following two claims:  
[3] someone’s morally enhancing himself will result in her having less free-
dom to have and to act upon bad motives; 
[4] a person has reason not to restrict her freedom to have and act upon 
bad motives 51. 
Claim [4] is, according to Douglas, problematic. He claims that it is not 
obvious that the freedom referred to therein has any value. Moreover, even if 
this freedom does have value, there may be no problem with restricting it, 
provided that the restriction is itself self-chosen 52.  
John Harris has recently mounted the following objection to moral bioen-
hancement. Harris believes moral enhancement is wrong because it restricts 
the freedom to do wrong, and thus undermines autonomy. He implies that 
moral enhancement would somehow make it impossible to act immorally. 
Harris thinks that freedom consists not only in the freedom to make mistakes, 
but in the freedom to to something wrong. Consequently, without the free-
dom to make a mistake, good cannot be a choice. Also, for that matter, we 
eliminate the possibility of learning from our own mistakes. If we can never do 
a bad thing, then we lose the freedom to do wrong (evil), to sin. The freedom 
to do the bad thing is, in itself, an important human value. The objection can 
be expressed through the following premises: 
(1) It is morally better, all things considered, to have the freedom to do bad 
(and actually act upon that freedom), than to be forced to do good. 
(2) Moral bioenhancement takes away the freedom to do bad. 
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(3) Therefore, moral bioenhancement is, in some sense, a morally inferior 
way of ensuring moral conformity. 
We ask, first, whether this is so, and secondly, if it were impossible to act 
immorally, whether this would be a bad thing 53.  
Let’s consider the first two premises in some detail. Is it good to be free to 
do evil? The first premise of the argument makes a contentious value claim. It 
states that the freedom to do bad is such an important good that a world 
without it is worse than a world with it. But in comparison to safety from evil, 
it can be disputable. Freedom is only one value. It is equally important to be 
safe and secure, and a world without crime and violence might be better than 
complete freedom and a lot of crime. In the absence of perfectly effective 
moral enhancement, the loss of freedom in one domain of our lives – the free-
dom to commit evil deeds - would be worth the benefits, as we would remain 
free otherwise. Even in those cases in which moral bioenhancement could un-
dermine autonomy, the value of human wellbeing and respect for the most 
basic rights outweigh the value of autonomy. This is not controversial. What 
could be a more moral way to prevent harm to others than to cause a person 
to change her mind? We are not free to commit serious crimes even now – the 
laws prohibit it on pain of punishment. If this is a loss, it would be out-
weighed by the fact that there would be no victims suffering from serious 
crimes 54. 
I would argue that the objection about the reduction of freedom stands, 
because by using enhancements our freedom is being reduced, but in some 
cases this is justified. For example, the freedom of prisoners (although anoth-
er kind of freedom) is also reduced, but this reduction is very reasonable and 
justified. In addition to this, we can make an analogy with political freedom, 
the freedom to act independently of the will of other citizens. Laws restrict us 
in a certain sense too, but this does not mean they are unreasonable. It can 
only be a problem of equality or asymmetry of power. None of us should be 
morally superior to others. But this asymmetry already exists without moral 
enhancement. In addition, a morally enhanced person will not harm other, 
morally unenhanced individuals. This inequality can actually be reduced by 
making morally deficient persons more moral, so that they are closer to mor-
ally average persons.  
Not all restrictions on our freedom are bad. For example, it is not bad for 
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us to have a reaction of disgust, instilled in childhood, which makes us inca-
pable of putting faeces in our mouth. This is a reaction that protects us from 
many infections. Other restrictions to our freedom are not imposed naturally, 
but socially. For example, our (moral) education is designed to deter us from 
carrying out certain acts, such as injuring or killing. The state also punishes 
such actions. Therefore, there are various social restrictions on our freedom. 
In general, these limitations are not voluntary, that is, we do not choose freely 
that they apply to us. But, surely, some of these restrictions are good and justi-
fied because the consequences of their imbalance would be detrimental to us. 
Accordingly, some non-voluntary restrictions on our freedom are beneficial. 
Also, freedom is one value, but not the only one; security is another. 
One more response to the objection that bioenhancers reduce the agent's 
freedom, and that this reduction is unjustified, can be found in the claims of 
Vojin Rakić. He argues that we can have an entirely free will that does not limit 
the effectiveness of moral bioenhancement. We are free to decide whether we 
wish to be morally bioenhanced. If we decide to be enhanced, we have not giv-
en up our freedom. We have only used our freedom to decide to be morally bi-
oenhanced. When people use bioenhancers that make them more altruistic, this 
does not lead to the conclusion that people with a higher level of altruism are 
less free than people with a lower level of altruism. Moral enhancement that in-
creases empathy, and consequently altruism, in people does not restrict their 
freedom: people who are morally good (no matter whether they are morally bi-
oenhanced or not) and always try to do the right thing are not less free than the 
ones who are inclined to fail to do so. Still, by making moral enhancement 
compulsory, the state would indeed encroach upon the freedom of its citizens 55. 
So, what if an agent freely chooses to undergo moral enhancement? In that 
case we might argue that he has also freely chosen all his resulting good be-
havior. Consider the following story of Ulysses and the Sirens: 
«The story provides an example of what can be called an obstructive or irrational 
desire which goes against his best judgement. Ulysses was to pass “the Island of the 
Sirens, whose beautiful voices enchanted all who sailed near. [They] … had girls’ fac-
es but birds’ feet and feathers … [and] sat and sang in a meadows among the heaped 
bones of sailors they had drawn to their death”, so irresistible was their song. Ulysses 
desired to hear this unusual song, but at the same time wanted to avoid the usual fate 
of sailors who succumbed to this desire. So he plugged his men’s ears with bees’ wax 
and instructed them to bind him to the mast of his ship. He told them: “if I beg you to 
release me, you must tighten and add to my bonds.” As he passed the island, “the Si-
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rens sang so sweetly, promising him foreknowledge of all future happenings on 
earth.” Ulysses shouted to his men to release him. However, his men obeyed his pre-
vious orders and only lashed him tighter. They passed safely 56. Before sailing to the 
Island of the Sirens, Ulysses made a considered evaluation of what was best for him. 
Thinking clearly, with all the facts before him, he formed a plan which would enable 
him to both hear the song of the Sirens and live. His order that he should remain 
shackled was an expression of his autonomy. In the grip of the Sirens’ song, Ulysses’ 
strongest desire was that his men release him. But it was an irrational desire. At the 
time, this may have been his only desire. The song of the Sirens was irresistible. We 
see in this case how it is necessary to frustrate some of a person’s desires, even his 
strongest desires, if we are to respect his autonomy» 57. 
Another response to the objection from loss of freedom might be the fol-
lowing. Rakić proposes voluntary moral bioenhancement as a solution to this 
problem. He claims that if moral enhancement were to become compulsory, 
as proposed by Persson and Savulescu, our freedom would be restricted. Vol-
untary moral enhancement maintains that only voluntary enhancement will 
leave our autonomy intact. If we wish to diminish the danger of ultimate harm 
by restricting our freedom, we encroach upon a crucial element of our morali-
ty 58. If freedom is essential for our morality, and morality is a key element of 
us being ‘human’, the implication is that making moral enhancement obligato-
ry would deprive us, to some extent, of an important part of our human exist-
ence. It is critical that we keep our freedom intact. If we fail to do that, we will 
dispossess ourselves of something that is vital for our human status and will 
have already embarked upon the path of inflicting serious (if not ultimate) 
harm upon ourselves. Hence, Rakić argues in favour of voluntary instead of 
compulsory moral enhancement 59. 
Thus, based on everything we have considered so far, we can conclude that 
the objection that moral bioenhancement is wrong because it would compro-
mise the freedom to act immorally and undermine personal autonomy, and 
the ‘precious’ ‘freedom to fall’, is not so convincing. As Persson and Savulescu 
have noted, the enhancement of moral dispositions like altruism and a sense 
of justice would not undermine freedom of choice – it would not make people 
less free than those who are most moral today. Even if our freedom of choice 
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consists in our choices not being fully causally determined, it can’t be under-
cut by moral enhancement – rather, this freedom means that there are limits 
to the efficiency of moral enhancement, by whatever means, traditional or bi-
omedical. Even if moral bioenhancement interventions undermine autonomy, 
this might be justified if they prevent grave suffering 60.  
Moreover, moral enhancements which increase altruism, including empa-
thetic imagination of the suffering and interests of others, coupled with a 
sympathetic response to this, together with greater preparedness to sacrifice 
one’s own interests, greater willingness to co-operate, and better impulse con-
trol, would not undermine freedom or autonomy. Indeed, improved impulse 
control would enhance autonomy 61.  
There are clearly some kinds of moral bioenhancement that do not com-
promise freedom. Indeed, some ways of enhancing the dispositions necessary 
for morality would increase freedom and autonomy. In the most extreme cas-
es, where technology is able to remove the freedom to act in gravely immoral 
ways, the loss of such freedom could be outweighed by the suffering such be-
havioral modification would prevent 62. 
Freedom is a precious value of human beings, but some restrictions on 
freedom are justified: for example, when a person wants to kill another hu-
man, or when someone wants to have sex with a child. These are cases where 
we can surely say it is more than justified to reduce freedom. In addition, 
there are other values besides freedom. A balance of values is needed. Free-
dom is not the only and absolute value. For example, dignity is another one. A 
person who kills another surely loses her dignity. So, we can give the following 
answers to the objection about restricted freedom: 1) not all restrictions on 
freedom are bad; 2) there are other important values, such as safety and digni-
ty; 3) a person can choose to restrict her own freedom. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper offers a discussion of moral bioenhancement. After considera-
tion of arguments in favor of and against moral bioenhancement interven-
tions, we can conclude that there are reasonable worries about new technolo-
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gies, but none of these worries and objections are conclusive. Moreover, they 
do not provide reasons for a prohibition of moral bioenhancement. I have es-
pecially dealt with the objection about the restriction of freedom, since it can 
arguably be considered one of the most precious and essential characteristics 
of human beings. Although there might be justifiable claims about the re-
stricted freedom of the agents who would use these interventions, only limited 
restrictions are justifiable. If we want to live in a safe world, we have to accept 
some restrictions on our immoral inclinations and behaviour. Interventions of 
moral enhancement might restrict our freedom to a very small extent, but that 
would be reasonable. Freedom is a precious value of human beings, but some 
restrictions on freedom are justified. In addition, there are other values be-
sides freedom, such as dignity and honor. The issue of moral enhancement is 
very important, since moral behavior is, along with rationality, a precious val-
ue that constitutes us as human beings. Because of the prevalence of violence 
and other crimes, and with traditional means of moral education showing to 
be insufficient, there is indeed a need for moral bioenhancement. 
